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Introduction
Even if most immigrants come from non-
EU states, the EU membership is often 
considered as the UK’s perceived migration 
issue. Immigration is an actual problem in 
the UK and one of the main causes of Brexit. 
The debate regarding the immigrants issue is 
mostly referred to less developed countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe which joined 
the EU the latest. Some Britons considered 
that immigrants exerted high pressure on 
public services. Contrary to this opinion, Petroff 
(2016) showed that immigrants contribute to 
the country’s budget and stimulate economic 
growth. Most immigrants come to work and 
therefore, they pay taxes. Moreover, they often 
compensate for the ageing local population. 
According to the Brexit scenario, migration will 
be limited, which from the economic point of 
view implies lower economic growth and higher 
burden of the exchequer.
According to the principle of free movement 
of persons, goods, services and capital, non-
British EU citizens have the right to work in 
the UK (Boswell, 2016). As Staiger (2016) 
explained, the UK can completely control 
its borders and it is exempt from common 
standards in immigration and some asylum 
regulations. The number of the UK immigrants 
from the CEE countries increased after their 
entrance into the EU, but actually most of 
these emigrants preferred such countries as 
Germany, Spain, Italy and France (Čajka et al., 
2014; Tilford, 2015).
Rumpel et al. (2013) showed that migrants 
from CEE countries prefer cities or urban regions 
because of the employment opportunities. 
Moreover, microeconomic determinants of 
migration were identifi ed by Merkevicius et al. 
(2015) who consider that defi ciencies in human 
resources management in the developing 
countries determined migration in developed 
countries.
The main aim of this paper is to evaluate 
the question of migration in the context of 
economic development in the UK, to show 
the positive impact of the UK immigrants from 
the CEE countries on the UK economy after 
their economic integration, and the possible 
negative consequences of Brexit on the 
migration process from some CEE countries 
to the UK. We will focus only on the increase 
of the number of UK immigrants from these 
countries due to the EU membership, making 
comparisons with other CEE countries that 
did not entered the EU. The sample of the 
CEE countries was selected to include the 
available data on ethnic communities with 
a consistent number of immigrants. Due to 
the nature of data and the existence of some 
mixed effects in explaining the emigrants’ 
behaviour, some specifi c Poisson models 
were estimated. Moreover, a counterfactual 
analysis by comparing the EU countries with 
the group represented by Russia, and Ukraine 
was conducted. The infl uence of Brexit itself 
might reduce the number of immigrants from 
the CEE countries twofold, and potential future 
migration policies may reduce it further. The 
CEE emigrants might come back home or they 
can go to other EU countries (countries with 
a large number of CEE immigrants or on the 
opposite, to the countries with less immigrants).
Moreover, we empirically check the 
assumptions regarding the impact of 
CEE countries’ emigrants on the main 
macroeconomic indicators in the UK, proving 
that the results are consistent with the previous 
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studies on the immigrants overall. Emigrants 
from the CEE countries had a positive impact 
on the UK economy and their arrival in the UK 
should be stimulated after Brexit.
The paper is organized as follows. After the 
Introduction, a literature review is presented. 
The methodological framework is set up and the 
empirical results are interpreted. Conclusion is 
the fi nal part of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. After the 
Introduction, a literature review is presented. 
The methodological framework is set up and the 
empirical results are interpreted. Conclusion is 
the fi nal part of the paper.
1. Literature Review
This research focuses on the impact of 
economic integration and Brexit on the UK 
immigrants from less developed countries, 
namely, from the CEE. This assessment is 
necessary because both public opinion and 
literature show positive and negative effects of 
immigration on the UK economy. Our position is 
consistent with the empirical fi ndings presented 
in economic literature that show the positive 
impact of the EU immigration on the UK. In 
this case, the reduction of EU immigrants after 
Brexit will bring along lower economic growth 
and austerity measures. One of our tasks is 
to measure the decrease in the number of the 
UK immigrants from the CEE countries and to 
propose policies to alleviate this decline.
Considering any sort of economic 
integration, four freedoms specifi c to internal 
markets are affected: free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital. In this 
context, Ebell and Warren (2016) showed that 
EU membership had a positive impact on the 
UK immigrants, because of free movement 
of capital and because of free movement of 
goods and services, including labour mobility 
and passporting that made the UK an attractive 
destination for emigrants from the entire 
Europe. Robinson (2015) stated that probably 
the most important consequence of Brexit 
would affect the movement of capital that will 
affect businesses by bringing more uncertainty. 
Investment would fall as a result, especially by 
footloose multinationals who would fi nd the UK 
a less attractive location. The resulting damage 
to the UK´s long term prospects for growth in 
national income, and hence company revenues 
and profi ts, could have a negative impact on the 
share prices.
According to economic theory, mobility of 
production factors ensures better resource 
allocation at international level which brings 
along welfare increase (Grosu & Dinu, 2016). 
This applies to capital (Jäger-Ambrożewicz 
& Matthes, 2012) and also to labour mobility 
even if the policies are very sensitive to the 
migration problem (Lodewyckx et al., 2010; 
Giovanni et al., 2012; Wadsworth, 2015; 
Aichele & Felbermayr, 2015). According to 
the endogenous growth theory, a liberal trade 
mode generates benefi ts to the industries with 
an obvious competitive advantage (Rebelo, 
1991; Romer, 1994; Vitunskiene & Serva, 2015; 
Stefaniak-Kopoboru & Kuczewska, 2016). This 
theory proves that faster economic growth can 
be achieved through specialisation and the 
reduction of product unit costs. Taylor et al. 
(1993), Duczynski (2000) noted that countries 
with higher level of trade openness have 
higher opportunities to exploit technological 
innovations, which also determines faster pace 
of their economic growth. According to the 
product life cycle theory, having standardized 
product technologies, companies tend to 
relocate their production to countries with 
comparatively low capital intensity (Hirsch, 
2009; Farmer & Schelnast, 2012). This is 
the reason for advanced innovations and 
technologies fl ow from leading economies to 
followers via trade openness. Greater rate 
of innovation and technology absorptions 
promotes the raise of human resources skills 
and capacities (Balcerzak, 2016), which, in 
turn, leads to economic growth in the long run 
(Pilinkiene, 2016).
The Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEs) are experiencing high growth 
rates in terms of trade openness. The total trade 
openness index for the CEEs in 2014 reached 
136.4 percent, and in comparison to 2000 
increased by 45 percent. Slovak Republic (trade 
openness index is equal to 180%), Estonia 
(167%) and Lithuania (163%) are attributed to 
CEEs countries with the highest degree of trade 
openness whereas Romania (82%) and Poland 
(78%) show the lowest degrees in this respect. 
It is important to note that trade openness index 
for the least trade open CEEs is equal to the 
average of the EU (81.3%), which proposes 
that the old EU member-states are substantially 
more closed for international trade, but have 
higher degree of competitiveness. With the 
reference to the data of the World Economic 
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Forum, in 2014 Germany, one of the most 
competitive EU states, occupied the 5th position 
in the Global Competitiveness Index, but had 
trade openness index equal to 85 percent, i.e. 
slightly higher than the EU average. Hence, it is 
purposeful to research whether higher degree 
of country’s competitiveness leads to lower 
degree of trade openness and vice versa, and 
to defi ne the conditions for this interrelation 
(Pilinkiene, 2016; Lelek, 2014).
A major argument for Brexit was the 
possibility to control more the immigration to the 
UK from the other EU countries. The level of net 
inward migration has been at record high levels 
in recent years, with the latest data showing net 
infl ows of 323,000 over the year to Q3 2015. 
Net immigration from the EU countries was 
172,000 over this period, only a touch lower 
than 184,000 recorded over the year to Q1 2015 
(Goodwin, 2016). British population common 
perception is that uncontrolled immigration will 
affect their wages, their jobs and overall life 
quality. Immigration reduction is demanded by 
a high percentage of population (between 44% 
according to Ipsos-Mori and 71% according to 
5 News and YouGov) because of the burden 
on public services, salaries, unemployment 
and cultural issues (Boswell, 2016). 58% of the 
Britons consider that the EU emigrants should 
fi rst have a defi nite job, before their arrival in 
the UK (Daily Express, 2016).
Economists have a different perception 
of the migration issue. Most of the arguments 
encourage the EU immigration. Usually, these 
immigrants are younger, more educated and 
ready to work, having fewer benefi ts than the 
UK-born. While the Britons are concerned with 
higher competition for jobs, immigrants would 
actually use services and goods, thus increasing 
the overall demand and creating more job 
opportunities. Moreover, immigrants might have 
complementary skills. There are many studies 
analysing the impact of immigration on jobs and 
salaries of the UK-born workers (Wadsworth, 
2015; Portes, 2016; Dustmann et al., 2005). 
All these studies indicated that immigration 
increase did not signifi cantly affect jobs and 
salaries of the UK-born workers in a negative 
way. The empirical evidences of Wadsworth et 
al. (2016) suggested that the zones with high 
growth in the EU immigrants did not registered 
greater fall in jobs and wages paid to the UK-
born people. The real cause for the decrease 
in salaries after 2008 was in fact the world 
fi nancial crisis and the problems with achieving 
fast economic recovery but not the immigration 
increase. On the other hand, there is little 
evidence regarding less jobs and salaries for 
low skilled UK-born workers because of the EU 
immigrants that are more educated.
Immigrants bring in extra resources that 
might be further used to increase spending 
on local health and education for the UK-born 
people. By reducing the EU immigration greater 
austerity is required. The economic literature 
demonstrates a consensus regarding positive 
effects of foreign direct investment and trade 
on the UK productivity. But there is less of 
a consensus regarding the consequences of 
immigration on productivity in the UK. Previous 
studies found a strong evidence for positive 
effects in case of more educated immigrants 
((Ortega & Peri, 2014; Ottaviano et al., 2016) 
for the UK service productivity). For overall 
immigration, most of empirical researches 
detected positive or even insignifi cant effects. 
An evaluation carried out by Felbermayr et 
al. (2010) showed that a 10% increase in the 
immigrant stock generates the gain of 2.2% in 
per capita income in general.
The EU immigrants diminish the budget 
defi cit, because they pay more taxes as 
compared to the money for welfare and 
utilization of public services. Immigrants do not 
negatively affect the local services on the 
problems regarding education, healthcare, 
crime or social housing.
Regarding the impact of immigrants on 
public fi nances, Dustmann and Frattini (2014) 
showed that the EU immigrants have a positive 
fi scal contribution by paying more taxes than 
getting benefi ts in terms of welfare. On the 
other hand, the UK-born citizens receive more 
benefi ts than they pay taxes. Springford (2013) 
and Milaszewicz et al. (2015) considered that 
the main determinant of the migration from the 
CEE countries to the UK is the welfare gap. 
Springford (2013) showed that only 0.8 percent 
of the EU immigrants received unemployment 
benefi t one year after their arrival in Britain. 
Most immigrants come to Britain only to fi nd jobs 
and not for higher welfare. 71% of immigrants 
come to the UK for jobs and 6% of them are 
unemployed, but they do not require allowance 
support (Petroff, 2016).
The Offi ce for Budget Responsibility 
(2013) forecasted a national debt for UK 
by 40 percentage points higher till 2062 if 
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net immigration will become null. If the EU 
immigrants are net contributors, there is not any 
evidence they will ask for public services. They 
bring more resources that might be used to 
increase spending on education and healthcare 
for the UK-born people. Reduction of the EU 
immigration would bring greater austerity. 
Dhingra et al. (2016) showed that one of the 
measures in these cases would be cutbacks 
determined by slower economic growth. The 
cutting backs on public services could not be 
attributed to immigrants.
Some Britons claim about that social 
disruptions are often caused by immigrants, but 
their assumption has no proof when it comes to 
the actual crime rates. The empirical fi ndings of 
Bell et al. (2013) suggested that high increase 
in immigration after 2004 when many East 
European countries entered the EU did not 
have any impact on crime level as such.
There is also no impact of immigration on 
educational attainment as proved Geay et al. 
(2013). The immigrants’ pupils work hard at 
school to overcome the disadvantage of having 
English as a second language.
The EU immigrants are younger than non-
EU ones and the chances to use healthcare 
services are thus fewer. Moreover, Wadsworth 
(2013) explained that there is lower usage 
of hospitals and doctors by immigrants as 
compared to the UK-born. Giuntella et al. 
(2015) found little effect of immigration on the 
waiting time in the National Health System.
The perception that immigrants receive 
better treatment when they apply for social 
housing is declined by Battiston et al. (2013) 
who showed there are lower chances for 
immigrants to be in social housing.
Many Britons are concerned about the 
impact of immigration on housing prices. 
Housing supply is low even if disregarding 
the EU immigrants. The main reason is 
a weak planning system that does not provide 
suitable infrastructure decisions (Hilber, 2015). 
Moreover, Sa (2015) emphasized there is 
no empirical evidence that immigration had 
a positive impact on house pricing.
All these arguments basing on the empirical 
evidences show that immigration has positive 
effects on the UK economy. The following issue 
discussed in literature is related to immigration 
restrictions after Brexit. Our research shows 
that the number of immigrants in the UK from 
the CEE countries will automatically decrease 
in a natural way. In this context, the UK policies 
should be oriented towards the attraction of 
new immigrants. Restrictions reducing the CEE 
emigration will not be benefi cial for the UK 
economy.
If the UK will remain the member of the 
European Economic Area or European Free 
Trade Area, it should apply no restrictions on the 
EU immigration, like Switzerland and Norway 
do today. Restriction could appear when the UK 
imposes a looser trading agreement with more 
trade costs. A visa scheme might be adopted 
like in the case of non-EU countries if the UK 
wants to reduce the number of EU immigrants 
after Brexit. Moreover, the UK will cut the skilled 
EU immigration that might not be replaced with 
non-EU skilled immigration. The skills’ gap will 
be narrower because when the job market 
becomes saturated, labour immigrants will be 
rejected and thus they will leave the UK.
Offi ce for Budget Responsibility (2015) 
forecasted an increase in unemployment of 
60,000 people which will also affect immigrants. 
After Brexit, the minimum salary is expected 
to increase. Growing productivity brought by 
immigrants might increase national wages. 
However, in the lack of labour force with high 
productivity, wages might not increase. By 
cutting the EU immigrants to 80,000 people per 
year, Boubtane et al. (2015) showed that labour 
productivity might decrease by 0.16% and in 10 
years after Brexit GDP per capita could be 1.6% 
lower as compared to the case when UK would 
have remained in the EU.
Migration Watch considered that the UK 
needs a stable population growth and this might 
be achieved by bringing migration back to its 
level of the 1980s and 1990s. The reconsidered 
policies should ensure increasing outfl ows 
and a more temporary migration. ITV (2016) 
considers that free movement end will not 
reduce dramatically the number of immigrants, 
but our empirical evidence will show that this 
impact will be very large.
The people who sustained Brexit considered 
that the EU migration will be controlled, but in 
case of trade agreements with the EU there will 
be still free movement of persons for the EU 
citizens like in Switzerland and Norway.
If the UK follows the Norway model, it has 
to accept free movement of persons and also 
higher proportion of the EU immigrants than it 
prefers (Staiger, 2016). If the Switzerland model 
will be taken into account, only partial access to 
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the Single Market is allowed, with uncontrolled 
immigration from Europe.
After Brexit, Boswell (2016) and Booth 
(2015) proposed policies ensuring better wages 
and better training and education of British 
labour force mostly in the construction sector. 
Drastic reduction of labour will have damaging 
effects on such sectors as food processing, 
manufacturing, cleaning, health, and tourism 
(Boswell, 2016). Migration reduction while 
stabilizing the population rate might bring along 
negative trade-offs and costs; mostly in low-
salary sectors like the care work (The Migration 
Observatory, 2012).
Boronska-Hryniewiecka (2016) considers 
that the output will decrease by more than 1% 
by 2010 if the number of immigrants is reduced 
annually by 100,000 people. Government 
policies could focus more on skills rather than 
on workers’ origin countries. This policy might 
promote the productivity growth, according to 
Woodford (2016). After Brexit, the immigrants’ 
unemployment could rise and the salary could 
decrease. In case of a signifi cant reduction 
in the number of immigrants as we stated, 
the benefi ts for even highly skilled sectors 
are rather doubtful (Boronska-Hryniewiecka, 
2016; Boswell, 2016). Chu (2016) considers 
that the decrease in economic performance 
after Brexit might be alleviated if immigration 
reduction becomes insignifi cant. This will help 
GDP stabilize and the income per capita will 
grow. A liberal policy on migration will increase 
GDP till 2030, according to Booth (2015). For 
covering the necessity in low-skilled jobs, the 
UK might continue receiving the EU immigrants.
In the case of post-Brexit points system, 
the solutions might include a specifi c temporary 
migration scheme for the EU migrants or 
preferential treatment for these migrants 
(Ruparel, 2016). Another scenario might be 
the bilateral agreements with the selected EU 
states.
PwC (2016) proposed a CGE model for the 
UK economy to measure the effects of changes 
in migration policies after Brexit. The long-run 
impact on the UK economy is related to lower 
long-term potential growth as compared to the 
situation of remaining in the EU. Less fl exibility 
of the labour market is expected after Brexit and 
a more cyclical economy with more frequent 
recessions.
Taken into account the anticipated effects 
of Brexit on immigration and further negative 
consequences on economic growth due to 
immigration, we consider necessary to assess 
Brexit impacts on immigration. Moreover, some 
policy measures are proposed to alleviate the 
negative consequences for the UK economy. 
To achieve this goal, a specifi c methodology 
is proposed here. It is described in the next 
section.
2. Methodology and Data
In this paper, two types of methods are applied 
to explain the number of immigrants in the 
UK when the origin countries are represented 
by some CEE states: mixed-effects Poisson 
regression models and counterfactual analysis 
based on difference-in-difference estimator. 
The mixed-effects Poisson models are 
employed when we want to analyze the counts 
number in a period (in our case, the number of 
immigrants in the UK in a certain period). Mixed-
effects models include both fi xed and random 
effects. These models allows for predictions of 
unobserved levels of random-effects factors. 
The Poisson models based on count data 
eliminate the necessity of normal distributed 
errors. Difference-in-difference estimator is an 
approach used to make comparison between 
two groups of countries before and after an 
event: treatment group (the CEE countries 
that are in the EU) and control group (the CEE 
countries that are not members of EU). The 
event considered in this study is the entrance in 
the EU of some CEE countries.
The mixed-effects Poison regression 
model describes the expected counts number 
in a certain period when specifi c events are 
registered (tij):
E(yij ) = μij = tijexp [x
'
ij β + z
'
ijϑi ]
where
i = 1,2,…,N level – 2 units which are for 
clusters.
j = 1,2,…,ni level – 1 units which are for 
multiple observations.
yij – dependent variable counting the 
number of events.
tij – period when the events are registered 
(this is the offset variable).
tij = t, when all observations are related to 
the same period when the events are registered.
tij varies if the observations are related to 
varying periods; this variable is essential in 
modelling process.
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xij – covariates at the fi rst, the second 
level or cross-level interactions; this variable 
can include polynomials, dummy variables, 
interactions etc.
β – regression coeffi cients corresponding to 
covariates.
zij – random effect variable or variables that 
can be, mostly, an intercept for longitudinal data 
and for clustered data or time.
ϑi – random effects that follow a normal 
distribution of null average and a certain 
variance-covariance matrix Σ
ϑ
.
The random effects describe how a certain 
cluster i infl uences the observations within the 
cluster and the way in which a cross-section 
starts and makes any progress in time.
log (μij ) = log (tij ) [x
'
ij β + z
'
ij ϑi ]
log (μij ) = log (tij ) = x
'
ij β + z
'
ij ϑi 
log (μij / tij ) = x
'
ij β + z
'
ij ϑi 
In case of the Poisson regression, the link 
function is represented by the log link function. The 
incidence (event rate ratio or) is equalled to exp β.
If an offset variable is not included in the 
model, the mixed-effects Poison regression is 
expressed as:
log (μij ) = x
'
ij β + z
'
ij ϑi
The model with offset variable is represented 
as:
log (μij ) = log (tij ) + x
'
ij β + z
'
ij ϑi
The logarithm of the offset variable works as 
an explanatory variable having a slope equalled to 
1. For Poisson models, we consider that the mean 
and the variance are equalled. The overdispersion 
is specifi c to cases when the variance is higher 
than the mean. This overdispersion, often met in 
a real data, produces estimated distortion. The 
chances of overdispersion can be considerably 
reduced by including random effects and the 
individual differences. For a Negative Binomial 
model, an overdispersion parameter is considered 
for relaxing this assumption. In other words, the 
Poisson model is a special case of the Negative 
Binomial Model when the overdispersion 
parameter is zero.
Gibbons et al. (2008) described three 
methods of estimating the parameters 
of a Poisson regression: parametric fully 
Bayes (FB) or semi-parametric estimation 
and empirical Bayes (EB) estimation. The 
differences between approaches consist in the 
different ways of specifying and estimating the 
random coeffi cients vector distribution. A normal 
distribution is considered for parametric FB 
and EB. The distribution’s coeffi cients for EB 
method are inferred using point estimation 
in case of maximum marginal likelihood. The 
inference uses posterior distribution for FB 
method. In the case of semi-parametric FB 
estimation, a non-parametric prior is associated 
to random effects distribution. The EB approach 
has as a disadvantage the assumption of 
known random effect covariance matrix. FB 
approaches overcome this limit by including 
a prior distribution for the coeffi cients that 
are associated to random effects distribution. 
Parametric FB method employed by El-Sayyad 
(1973) makes inferences for mixed-effects 
Poisson regressions, an improper prior being 
considered. For large shape parameter the 
distribution for gamma variable logarithm is 
approximated by the normal distribution. In this 
case, the posterior density follows a multivariate 
normal repartition. A more fl exible approach 
is the semi-parametric FB method, because 
Dirichelet process stands for the entire space 
of repartitions corresponding to random effects. 
All the normal distributions are included.
For making comparisons between groups 
after a certain treatment or intervention, the 
entrance into the EU in our case, the differences-
in-Differences (DD) estimation might be used. 
It is used to estimate causal relationships. 
The differences in outcomes (number of the 
UK emigrants from some CEE countries) 
are compared before and after the entrance 
into the EU for countries that supported the 
intervention to the same difference for states 
that did not become EU member states. Beside 
its simplicity, the DD approach surpasses many 
issues regarding the endogeneity determined 
by comparisons between heterogenous 
cross-sections (Meyer, 1995). The method is 
recommended for random interventions which 
are conditioned by fi xed effects and time. In 
case of intervention’s endogeneity the results 
become invalid. In many cases, DD estimators 
and the associated standard errors use the 
Ordinary Least Squares on cross-section or 
panel data. In this particular research, there are 
countries in treatment (those that entered into 
the EU at a certain time) and control countries 
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for years before and after the European 
economic integration. If Yist is the outcome for 
country i from group s (country s) by moment t, 
a dummy variable Ist is included for marking the 
effect of the intervention (entrance in the EU) of 
that group at a certain moment.
Yist = As + Bt + cXist + βIst + eist
As , Bt – fi xed effects.
Xist – individual control.
eist – error term.
The impact of the intervention is measured 
by the estimate of β. The confi dence intervals 
are based on this parameter and the OLS 
standard error that are sometimes corrected 
with the shocks’ correlation in each country 
and each year. The presented specifi cation 
is the general form of the DD estimation 
with 2 periods and 2 groups. The results are 
valid if the changes in time in the dependent 
variable would have been the same in both 
groups in the lack of the intervention l. When 
errors’ serial correlation occurs, the t-statistics 
and the associated signifi cance levels are 
overestimated. There are various causes for 
serial correlation, but different procedures are 
employed for correcting it.
In this study, the dependent variable refers 
to the number of immigrants in the UK where 
the origin countries are represented by some of 
the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) states: 
Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, 
the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Russia and Ukraine. Excepting the last three 
countries, all the other ones are member states 
of the European Union. These particular CEE 
countries were selected from the representative 
sample of 60 countries with the signifi cant 
number of emigrants in the UK. For the other 
CEE countries the data are not available and 
the number of emigrants is not too high. The 
explanatory variables are represented by: real 
GDP per capita, real wage, distance between 
London and the capital of each state and 
unemployment rate in these origin countries for 
immigrants. A dummy variable called the EU 
member is introduced to mark the states that are 
in the EU from a certain year. The models are 
based on panel data, covering these 12 countries 
and the period from 2004 to 2014. Bulgaria and 
Romania entered into the EU in 2007, while the 
rest of the mentioned CEE states, excluding 
Russia and Ukraine, are the members since 
2004. The number of immigrants was taken from 
the database of the Offi ce for National Statistics 
in the UK. The distances were measured in 
kilometres and they refer to air distances, being 
provided by http://www.distancefromto.net/. The 
data for the rest of the variables are provided by 
the World Bank.
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Poland 69 137 249 399 502 538 564 654 713 736 790
Lithuania 22 31 54 57 61 80 99 131 143 161 170
Czech Republic 12 20 24 25 26 30 37 41 43 42 47
Romania 10 15 14 19 37 57 78 98 108 135 170
Cyprus (Euro-
pean Union) 10 12 12 17 22 25 17 55 21 13 15
Bulgaria 9 12 14 15 29 35 46 50 56 51 65
Slovakia 9 24 47 50 45 54 50 61 66 55 68
Hungary 7  12 18 22 26 37 48 50 73 88
Latvia  13 18 21 29 27 49 61 71 89 101
Russia 21 20 19 21 27 19 28 43 37 35 31
Ukraine 9 10 13 17 15 14 13 12 13 17 19
Source: World Bank data
Tab. 1: The number of UK immigrants from some CEE countries (thousands persons)
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As Tab. 1 shows, the most UK immigrants 
from the CEE countries are from Poland with 
an obvious tendency of increase over 2004-
2014. Ukraine and Russia which are not the EU 
states are among the countries with the fewest 
emigrants to the UK. The number of Poland 
emigrants to the UK increased, in average, 
by 1.27 times over 2004-2014 and by 11.44 
times in 2014 compared to 2004. After Poland’s 
entrance into the EU, Great Britain was among 
the few countries that gave Polish people the 
right to work in the UK immediately. Around 
2 million Poles left their country since 2004 
and came in Britain being determined by high 
unemployment rate and low salaries in their 
state of origin. The Polish citizens represent 
the largest group of European foreigners 
in the UK. Like in the case of the other CEE 
countries, Polish people brought benefi ts to 
the Britain economy, because of the cheap 
labour force. According to Migration Advisory 
Committee Report (July 2014) immigrants 
from the CEE countries represent 3% of all 
employed people in UK. They work mostly in 
low-skill employment (4% of labour force), less 
in high-skill employment (2% of labour force). 
The total number of immigrants from these CEE 
countries rose by 7 times in 2014 in relation to 
2004.
The impact of immigration on main 
macroeconomic indicators in the UK, when 
the origin countries are in CEE, is assessed 
using Bayesian linear regression models 
over the period 2004-2014. These models 
are suitable for small sets of data, like in this 
case. The variables used in this analysis refer 
to: real GDP rate (%), (2005 = 100), infl ation 
rate (%), unemployment rate (%), real interest 
rate (%), share of manufacturing, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as a percent of GDP, the 
global competitiveness index, political stability, 
homicide rate, education spending as a percent 
of GDP, health spending as a percent of GDP, 
a number of the immigrants from the CEE 
countries.
The Global Competitiveness index is 
based on 12 pillars of competitiveness: basic 
requirements (Macroeconomic Stability, 
Infrastructure, Institutions, Health and Primary 
Education), effi ciency enhancers (Goods Market 
Effi ciency, Higher Education and Training, 
Labour Market Effi ciency, Technological 
Readiness, Financial Market Sophistication, 
Market Size) and innovation and sophistication 
factors (Innovation, Business Sophistication). 
The global competitiveness index decreased 
from a year to another during 2007-2009 in the 
UK on the basis of the global economic crisis. 
A slow increase of the index was observed 
since 2010 with a lower decrease in 2013. 
Even if the Global Competitiveness Report 
2015-2016 placed the UK on the 10th place in 
the world, the UK in the last few years faced 
problems like budget defi cit, low quality of the 
education system and the diffi culties countered 
by companies to take loans.
General government expenditure on 
education (capital, current, and transfers) as 
a percentage of GDP includes expenditure 
based on transfers from international sources to 
government. The source of data is represented 
by UNESCO. The education spending 
increased since 2008, but the education quality 
is still not at an acceptable level in the UK.
Total health expenditure indicator by the 
World Bank includes public and private health 
expenditure. It covers the family planning 
activities, provision of health services (curative 
and preventive), emergency aid for health 
and nutrition activities, but it does not include 
provision of sanitation and water. The health 
expenditure registered a very low average 
increase by 1.3% over that period.
Infl ation based on consumer price index 
shows the annual percentage change of the 
cost of acquiring a basket of services and goods 
by the average consumer that could be fi xed or 
changed at specifi ed times, mostly yearly. The 
infl ation rate registered a low average increase 
by 1.4%. In the post Brexit period, a high 
increase in prices is expected.
The real interest rate which is the lending 
interest rate adjusted for the GDP defl ator 
measured in percent is provided by the 
International Monetary Fund. Since 2009, the 
interest rate in the UK registered the negative 
values. There are a few reasons for this: the 
decline in the global interest rates because 
of the world fi nancial crisis, distortions in the 
government bonds market, the secular trends 
to ensure the long-run decline.
Manufacturing takes into consideration the 
industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. 
Value added represents a sector net output 
after adding up the outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. Deductions for depreciation 
of fabricated assets or depletion and 
degradation of natural resources are not made. 
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The value added is based on the International 
Standard Industrial Classifi cation (ISIC), third 
revision 3. The share of manufacturing begun 
to decrease since 2005 and since 2007 in the 
context of the economic crisis reached a value 
under 11%.
Unemployment rate represents the share 
of the labour force without work, but seeking 
employment and available for the job. The 
data series for these variables and for political 
stability are provided by the World Bank. 
A high increase in the unemployment rate 
was registered in 2009, because of the world 
economic crisis, which translates into increase 
by 44.44% compared to 2008. Since 2009, the 
unemployment rate continued to increase, but 
in 2014 it reached a lower value of 6.3%.
Homicide rate represents the number 
homicides per 100,000 people. The data series 
is provided by the UN offi ce on drugs and crime. 
This indicator registered a persistent decrease 
over 2004-2014 with an average decrease of 
almost 6.5%.
3. Results
The use of count data for dependent variable 
allows us to consider the Poisson models as 
the most suitable method of analysis. We work 
under the hypothesis that the quality of EU 
member is related to distance. There is a lower 
distance between London and the capitals of 
countries that are already EU member states.
The M1 mixed-effects Poisson model 
indicated that the EU membership had 
a positive impact on the emigrants from the CEE 
countries that chose the UK as a destination 
country. The increases in the GDP per capita 
in the selected CEE countries had a very low 
and negative impact on the emigration process 
towards the UK. 
Contrary to the expectations, unemployment 
rate had a negative effect on the number of 
the UK immigrants from the CEE countries 
while the wage had a positive effect. In case 
of Brexit, the number of immigrants from the 
CEE countries that are the EU members in the 
UK might decrease by 99.4%, according to M1 
Poisson model. However, the results should be 
cautiously considered, because many of the 
labour resources were not actually considered 
in the computation the unemployment rate in 
the origin country, being part of the underground 
economy.
The M2 mixed-effects Poisson model 
indicated again that the EU membership had 
a positive impact on the emigrants from CEE 
countries that chose the UK as a destination 
country. The distance is not relevant in 
explaining the immigration process in the UK 
from the CEE countries. The result is contrary 
to the conclusion of Hatton and Wiliamson 
(2005) for migration between continents. 
The correlation between GDP per capita and 
migration is still negative, but not so strong, 
Variable Coeffi cient z-calculated P>|z|
Wage 0.0102 82.13 0.000
GDP per capita –0.00034 –78.15 0.000
Unemployment rate –0.085 –22.23 0.000
EU member 10.0523 40.02 0.000
Constant 2.8835 11.67 0.000
Random effects parameter
EU_member: independent Estimate 
sd(ln(distance)) 0.00302 0.0010 –
sd(constant) 3.15*10-9 0.0503 –
Source: own
Prob. > chi-square=0.000
Tab. 2: Mixed-effects Poisson model for explaining the number of UK immigrants (M1) from main CEE (2004-2014)
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because underground economy still could offer 
jobs in the origin country. In the case of Brexit, 
the result is consistent with the previous model. 
The number of immigrants in the UK from the 
CEE countries that are the EU members might 
decrease by 99.6%, according to M2 Poisson 
model.
Another approach supposes to make 
a comparison between the CEE countries that 
are in the EU and Russia and Ukraine. The 
counterfactual analysis is suitable for measuring 
of the impact of an intervention (CEE countries 
entrance in the EU) and the difference-to-
difference estimator will be provided.
The difference-in-difference estimator 
approach indicated that the entrance of some 
CEE countries into the EU had a positive impact 
on the number of immigrants in the UK that 
increased by 12 times compared to Russia and 
Ukraine. The coeffi cient for year is not signifi cant 
at 5% level of signifi cance which implies that 
even before the entrance into the EU, CEE 
countries sent many migrants in the UK.
There are no studies that assess the impact 
of the UK immigrants from the CEE countries 
on these variables. However, comparisons may 
be done with the previous studies that evaluate 
this impact for all UK immigrants. From our point 
of view, it is more relevant to assess the impact 
on the CEE countries immigration, because 
pro Brexit group complained more about the 
immigration of the citizens from these countries. 
According to Akaike information criterion, the 
data are stationary at 5% level of signifi cance.
According to Bayesian model, the number 
of immigrants originating from the CEE 
countries had a positive, but low impact on the 
real economic growth over 2004-2014.
The number of immigrants in the UK from 
the CEE countries had a negative, but very 
low (almost 0) infl uence on the price stability 
in the UK. This means that the increase in the 
immigration from the CEE countries will slowly 
decrease the infl ation.
There was a positive correlation between 
the infl ation and the unemployment rate in the 
Variable Coeffi cient z-calculated P>|z|
Distance 0.0056 0.56 0.000
GDP per capita –0.00003 –21.74 0.000
EU member 6.2386 28.55 0.000
Constant –1.8926 –6.48 0.000
Random effects parameter
EU_member: independent Estimate 
sd(ln(distance)) 0.0022 0.0009 –
sd(constant) 2.56*10-8 0.0386 –
Source: own
Prob. > chi-square = 0.000
Tab. 3: Mixed-effects Poisson model for explaining the number of the UK immigrants (M2) from main CEE (2004-2014)
Variable Coeffi cient t-calculated P>|z|
Year 1.2245 1.67 0.066
EU member –25,336.67 –2.55 0.023
Year x EU member 12.0286 2.60 0.023
Constant –2,398.554 –1.34 0.078
Source: own
Prob. > chi-square=0.000
Tab. 4:
Linear regression model based on difference-to-difference estimator 
for explaining the number of the UK immigrants (M3) from the main CEE 
countries (2004-2014)
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UK over 2004-2014. Ormerod et al. (2013) 
showed the instability of the empirical Phillips 
curve on short-run with the endemic cause.
There is a very low and negative impact of 
the UK immigrants from the CEE countries on 
the homicide rate. Moreover, we can state that 
the homicide rate decreased after 2004.
The infl uence of immigrants on the 
education spending is positive, but very low. 
The immigrants’ children usually work harder at 
school to overcome the disadvantage of having 
English as second language.
The impact of immigrants on the health 
spending is positive, but quite low. Usually, the 
Variable Posterior mean of coeffi cient Posterior standard deviation of coeffi cient 
Constant –5.5202 9.7633
Infl ation rate 0.4529 0.8220
FDI 0.0303 0.2976
Unemployment rate –1.6433 1.0202
Real interest rate –0.5633 0.79934
Immigrants 0.0034 0.0026
Share of manufacturing 1.2855 0.7867
Variance 3.0394 1.6112
Source: own
Tab. 5: Bayesian linear regression for explaining the real GDP rate in the UK over 2004-2014
Variable Posterior mean of coeffi cient Posterior standard deviation of coeffi cient 
Constant 0.2776 1.4734
Unemployment rate 0.3886 0.3287
Immigrants –9.0654e-005 8.9884e-004
Variance 0.9988 0.4437
Source: own
Variable Posterior mean of coeffi cient Posterior standard deviation of coeffi cient 
Constant 0.5688 8.9557
Infl ation rate 0.2639 0.3558
Real GDP rate 0.0769 0.3117
Political stability –5.606 4.9654
Competitiveness 1.2477 1.7496
Immigrants 0.0013 0.0048
Variance 0.8391 0.5583
Source: own
Tab. 6: Bayesian linear regression for explaining the infl ation rate in the UK over 2004-2014
Tab. 7: Bayesian linear regression for explaining the unemployment rate in the UK over 2004-2014
EM_1_2017.indd   39 13.3.2017   16:58:38
40 2017, XX, 1
Ekonomie
immigrants are young people that are able to 
work and have no major health problems.
All in all, we validated the assumptions for 
the CEE countries emigrants in the UK that 
were previously checked in literature for the all 
UK immigrants. These showed that arguments 
of pro Brexit group regarding immigration are 
not, actually, plausible. The UK immigrants 
coming from the CEE states slowly stimulated 
the economic growth in the UK and had a low 
positive infl uence on the unemployment. They 
contributed to the prices stability and lower 
crime rate and did not signifi cantly affect the 
increase in health and education spending. So, 
there are reasons not to control too strictly the 
CEE countries immigrations after Brexit.
4. Discussion
As expected, the EU membership had a positive 
impact on the emigration process to the UK. 
Many EU states put restrictions to migrants 
from new EU members that entered in 2004 and 
2007, excepting Cyprus and Malta, considering 
the concerns about negative impact of migration 
on their labour market. Only the UK, Ireland and 
Sweden decided to open their labour market 
immediately after 2004 (Kahanec et al., 2009) and 
many migrants came to work. The UK proposed 
only one restriction consisting in the adoption 
of a scheme that asks for the registration of the 
EU-28 workers with the Home Offi ce.
The increases in the GDP per capita in the 
mentioned CEE countries had a very low and 
Variable Posterior mean of coeffi cient Posterior standard deviation of coeffi cient 
Constant 1.8835 0.3034
Immigrants –5.2288e-004 2.7056e-004
Variance 0.2034 0.07764
Source: own
Tab. 8: Bayesian linear regression for explaining the homicide rate in the UK over 2004-2014
Variable Posterior mean of coeffi cient Posterior standard deviation of coeffi cient 
Constant 4.8971 0.4058
Immigrants 4.2239e-004 2.9988e-004
Variance 0.2365 0.09834
Source: own
Tab. 9: Bayesian linear regression for explaining the education spending in the UK over 2004-2014
Variable Posterior mean of coeffi cient Posterior standard deviation of coeffi cient 
Constant 8.0475 0.4533
Immigrants 0.0016 3.5673e-004
Variance 0.5036 0.1584
Source: own
Tab. 10: Bayesian linear regression for explaining the health spending in the UK over 2004-2014
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negative impact on the migration towards the 
UK. As we expected, the countries with low 
GDP per capita send the migrants to developed 
countries like the UK. A lower GDP per capita 
is related to higher poverty and less available 
jobs. All the CEE countries had lower GDP 
per capita than UK and a big part of migrants 
came to this state. This migrants’ behaviour 
is explained by economic reasons which is 
consistent with other results from literature. For 
example, Hatton and Wiliamson (2005) proved 
the correlation between changes in the GDP 
per capita in host country and the migration 
fl ow in the destination country that is richer. 
If the GDP per capita in the states from West 
Europe increases by 10 percent, the migration 
to the US decreases by 12.6 percent. In our 
empirical study, if the GDP per capita in the 
CEE countries doubles, the number of migrants 
to the UK decreases by only 0.04 percent. If 
these results are compared with the previous 
ones for EU membership, we can state that 
CEE migrants were attracted more by the jobs 
opportunities in the UK than by the poverty in 
the origin country.
The negative impact of unemployment in 
the origin country on the number of immigrants 
in the UK might be explained by different 
arguments. The fact that the CEE emigrants 
are not necessarily represented by people 
that do not have any job in the origin country 
might be an explanation for these results. 
They were looking for a higher salary in the 
UK, while the wage in the origin country was 
low. The recent economic literature is focused 
on the brain drain phenomenon in the Central 
and Eastern Europe (Ienciu & Ienciu, 2015). 
High skilled labour resources go to developed 
countries where the salaries are higher. The 
public policies in the origin countries are not 
in favour of qualifi ed adults and the brain drain 
represents an important capital loss. On the 
other hand, the brain drain might have long run 
positive effects in terms of remittances sent to 
origin countries (Kim & Lee, 2016).
The lack of statistical signifi cance of the 
distance between London and the capitals of 
CEE countries is in line with other empirical 
fi ndings from literature. In this context, Pytlikova 
(2006) indicated that the distance has a low 
infl uence in selecting emigrants’ destination 
country in the last decades.
The positive impact of EU membership on 
the migration behaviour in the CEE countries 
was also confi rmed by the difference-in-
difference approach. Actually, the political 
context after 1990s when CEE states made the 
transition from communist regime to a market 
economy and a democratic society changed 
the migration behaviour. Since 1990 these CEE 
countries sent many emigrants to developed 
states from the West of Europe. The 2004 EU 
enlargement intensifi ed the labour mobility from 
seven of the CEE countries to the UK. The 
2007 enlargement increased the number of 
immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria in the 
UK (Pemberton & Scullion, 2013).
The positive impact of immigration on 
the real economic growth is consistent with 
Petroff (2016) who showed that immigration 
stimulates the economic growth in the UK. 
Moreover, according to expectations, the FDI 
was an engine of the economic growth. The 
unemployment rate negatively affected the GDP 
growth, while the highest positive impact on 
economic growth was registered by the share 
of manufacturing. According to Cadman et al. 
(2016), manufacturing has a central position in 
British economy, even if its importance declined 
over the past decades. In 1948, its contribution 
was about 36 percent of GDP, while now it is 
about 10 per cent. The number of employees 
in the manufacturing sector declined faster than 
the output share, but the new technology made 
this sector more productive because of the 
higher value goods. Exports are the principal 
weak spot for manufacturing sector, being hit 
by the slowdown in the euro area. Domestic 
demand is rather strong in the UK, but the 
overall industry was smaller than it was before 
the downturn.
The negative impact of immigration on 
infl ation was also obtained by Frattini (2014) 
who showed that immigration contributed to the 
infl ation reduction for goods and services over 
1995-2006. Sa (2015) showed that there is no 
empirical evidence that the immigration had 
a positive impact on house pricing. The same 
result was also found by Wadsworth (2012). His 
study also shows no impact on rents, while the 
immigrants are much more likely to be in private 
rental accommodation in comparison with UK-
born individuals. According to Wadsworth 
(2012) 5.5% of immigrants represent 10.9% 
of workers in the construction industry. That 
is relatively fewer than in other sectors of 
British economy and it has no effect on cost of 
construction.
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The positive relationship between the 
infl ation and unemployment was also described 
by Batini et al. (2005) over 1987-1999. The 
number of immigrants had a positive, but very 
low impact on the unemployment rate in the UK. 
Contrary to expectations, the political stability 
was negatively correlated to unemployment. 
It was shown that the political stability did not 
solve the problem of unemployment in the UK. 
Dustmann et al. (2003) showed a positive impact 
of immigration on the unemployment rate over 
1971-1991. Regarding the EU immigrants, the 
Centre for Economic Performance confi rmed 
our results by showing that there is a little 
evidence that EU migrants had a positive effect 
on the UK unemployment. And more, according 
to the Department for Business Innovation & 
Skills (February 2015) migrants fi ll the gaps 
in the UK workforce. The jobs taken by the 
immigrants would be either empty or fi lled with 
under-qualifi ed staff. We found no impact of 
immigration on homicide rate, the conclusion 
being in line with Bell et al. (2013) who showed 
that there was no impact of immigration on crime 
rate. We proved the low impact of immigration 
on education spending. Geay et al (2013) also 
showed the lack of signifi cance of immigration 
on education spending in the UK.
Immigration in the UK also had a very 
low effect on health spending. A similar result 
was obtained by Wadsworth (2013) who 
found little evidence for the positive impact 
of EU immigration on the health spending. 
A possible explanation would be the fact that 
EU immigrants are younger and do not need 
special medical care.
Our fi ndings confi rmed the results of 
previous studies that were also based on 
empirical researches. The CEE immigrants 
played an important role in the UK economic 
growth with a very low impact on unemployment 
rate, health and education spending or crime 
rate, Moreover, the immigrants contributed to 
prices stability in the UK. After Brexit, if policies 
that restrict the access of immigrants from 
CEE countries on the UK labour market will be 
implemented, the economic growth and prices 
stability will be negatively affected.
Conclusions
As expected, in this paper we showed that 
the number of the UK immigrants from the 
CEE countries that are in the European 
Union signifi cantly increased due to the EU 
membership. In case of Brexit, this number 
might decrease by 2 times, according to 
mixed-effects Poisson model. Compared to 
Russia, and Ukraine, the number of CEE 
emigrants increased, in average, by 13 times 
over the period 2004-2014 because of the EU 
membership. The empirical research is limited 
by the data availability. For the rest of the CEE 
countries the number of UK immigrants is not 
provided by the Offi ce for National Statistics.
Our empirical evidences showed that CEE 
emigrants to the UK brought a positive impact 
on the UK economic growth, price stability 
and lower homicide rate. On the other hand, 
migration from the CEE states slightly increased 
the unemployment rate, health and education 
spending. The results are consistent with 
previous studies for all UK immigrants. A lower 
number of EU immigrants was also anticipated 
by Portes and Forte (2016).
Two main migration policies could be 
considered after Brexit. The UK imposed a cap 
of 20,700 Tier 2 visas per year. If this restriction 
will be applied to EU nationals, the number of EU 
workers will diminish. A second policy supposes 
that most of the non-EU nationals with Tier 2 
visas might stay permanently in the UK only 
in case of a minimum earning of £35,000 per 
year. Most of the migrants earn less than this 
valueand could stay maximum 6 months in the 
UK. If this restriction is applied, most of the EU 
migrants have to leave the UK or stay less time 
(Vargas-Silva, 2016). So, our empirical fi ndings 
are in line with the current migration policies 
that could apply after Brexit. If the government 
will chose to drop these restrictions for the 
EU migrants, the situation of migrants might 
change. Moreover, all the studies regarding 
Brexit underlined the uncertainty regarding the 
UK policies and the number of immigrants.
After Brexit, a policy of limiting the migration 
would lower the economic growth trend, even 
if GDP per capita might not be affected to 
the same magnitude. The UK policy options 
after Brexit might be various. The Norway 
or Switzerland models will encourage free 
movement of persons, goods, services and 
capital, but bilateral agreements with few 
countries will negatively affect the economic 
performance of the UK. If the UK will not 
implement policies for a lower reduction of 
immigration, the productivity and the labour 
market fl exibility will cause problems to the 
UK economy that might face more frequent 
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recessions. Our recommendation consists in 
policies that more focus on the labour market 
fl exibility after Brexit than policies that offer 
measures regarding the origin countries of the 
immigrants.
Our empirical fi ndings could be a suitable 
support in designing new migration policies for 
the UK, if this country will not be interested in 
reducing the number of immigrants from CEE 
countries, because most of them are workers 
that contribute to the UK economic growth. 
In a future research, a comparison between 
our predictions regarding the reduction in the 
number of immigrants and the real decrease is 
necessary.
This study might be also continued by 
considering other determinants of immigration 
in the UK. The poverty in the CEE countries 
might explain the orientation towards the UK, 
but long data series for poverty rate are still not 
available for all the CEE countries. In the context 
of Brexit’s impact on the UK immigration, the 
emigrants from the CEE countries should take 
into account other EU countries as destination. 
The number of the actual UK immigrants might 
be infl uenced by the policy measures after 
Brexit, but the chances to leave the UK are 
lower for stable immigrants.
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Abstract
THE EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE IMPACT 
OF BREXIT ON THE UK IMMIGRANTS FROM THE CEE COUNTRIES
Mihaela Simionescu, Yuriy Bilan, Luboš Smrčka, Zuzana Vincúrová
Considering the debates regarding lower increase in the economic growth after Brexit, the main 
objective of this paper is to measure the positive impact of economic integration of Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries on the UK economy and the effect of Brexit on the immigration 
from these countries to the UK. The European Union membership of some CEE countries increased, 
in average, the number of the UK immigrants by 12 times in the period 2004-2014 compared to the 
group of countries formed by Russia and Ukraine. The empirical fi ndings show positive economic 
effects of immigration on the UK’s economy, even if the pro Brexit group claimed that a control 
of immigration is necessary. CEE countries emigrants stimulated the UK economic growth, price 
stability and reduced the homicide rate. The effects of immigration on the unemployment rate, 
health and education spending were positive, but very low. According to mixed-effects Poisson 
models estimations, after Brexit the number of the UK immigrants from the CEE countries that 
are member of the EU might decrease by 2 times. This signifi cant decline in immigration might 
impose austerity measures, because of the fall in the economic growth trend with negative impact 
on the UK economy. Therefore, we recommend policies that focus more on high-skilled labour force 
than on the reduction of the number of immigrants. The UK should propose measures to slow the 
expected immigration decline in order to alleviate economic issues like decline in economic growth, 
decrease in labour productivity, cutting backs on public services.
Key Words: Immigrants, CEE countries, economic integration, Brexit, Poisson regression.
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